Ukraine: Hedging Bets to Retain Space Superiority
I wrote an analysis of Ukraine and its reliance on space power from commercial companies and friendly governments nearly two years ago. The article's upshot was that despite all of Russia’s fielded space assets and offensive capabilities, Ukraine appeared to be the more dominant space power despite not having any space assets to speak of.
Just in Case
But what happens if, sometime in January or February 2025, some of the most critical space infrastructure and services Ukraine relies on from the United States are shut off? News services have recently reported on a phone call featuring Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In that call, Trump and Musk appear to give Zelensky reassurances that Ukraine will continue to receive their support, including Starlink. It’s a little strange that Musk was on this call, but we’ll roll with it. I’ll also suggest that Zelensky had little choice but to put a positive spin on his perceptions of the call.
However, I’d also suggest Zelensky take stock of what Ukraine relies upon from the U.S. He’s already crossed paths with Trump before, with Trump unsuccessfully pressuring the Ukrainian president to dig up dirt on Trump’s political rivals. That history may mean that Ukraine will still suffer from U.S. assets and support withdrawal. Zelensky and his staff likely already have a long list of both that require alternates, as they surely have been following the U.S. political environment.
U.S.-provided Space Services
The following list contains the space assets he and Ukraine’s military should worry about. Then, I’ll suggest some alternatives that Ukraine might be able to turn to. Some of the space assets likely aren’t as valuable as ammunition and other support, but they still help Ukraine.
Communications:
- Starlink, Iridium
- U.S. government-owned communications systems (AEHF, WGS, BlackJack, Checkmate, etc.)
Global Navigation Satellite Services:
- GPS
Imagery:
- Planet, Maxar, BlackSky, etc.
- U.S. government-owned imagery systems
Weather:
- Tomorrow.IO, PlanetIQ, etc.
- U.S. government-owned systems, such as GOES, WFO, etc.
Radar:
- Capella, Umbra, etc.
- U.S. government-owned systems
Radio Frequency Monitoring:
- HawkEye 360
- U.S. government-owned systems
Missile Warning:
- SBIRS, PWSA
It’s not clear if the commercial companies mentioned supply data to Ukraine. They probably do, but the U.S. government is likely an intermediary. They may not know whether the U.S. government is sharing the information with Ukraine but suspect it is because their satellites are tasked with watching over the country.
GPS is known to be a ubiquitous tool that is globally available. However, the U.S. military can apparently shut off GPS for an area on Earth. No U.S. support of Ukraine may logically extend to shutting GPS access off.
Starlink is the most critical part of Ukraine's communications infrastructure. Communications were one of the Russian military’s first targets at the beginning of the war. Starlink is important, but it’s also under unreliable leadership. Musk has stated a few times that he’s against Ukraine’s use of Starlink in the war against Russia. He deliberately hobbled Starlink from working in an area of Ukraine in which its military was using it to target Russian military ships. He doesn’t appear to have similar reservations about the U.S. military using SpaceX-supplied Starshield satellites.
A few readers may wonder why U.S. commercial companies would stop supplying Ukraine with space data. The answer is contracts! Many of these space companies rely on U.S. government contracts. They might not wish to put those contracts at risk by providing products to Ukraine. If they offer them anyway, that’s a good thing for Ukraine.
The Good Thing about Global Competition
Another good thing for Ukraine is that it can choose from global commercial and government space products and services, not just those of the U.S. The alternatives may cause some U.S. companies to reconsider stepping away from Ukraine. If U.S. companies cede this part of the market, it would be challenging to step back in since the Ukrainian government can’t trust them for stable services.
Here are a few alternatives:
Communications:
- EutelSat OneWeb (France), SES (Luxembourg)
Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS):
- Galileo (Europe)
- BeiDou (China)
- NavIC (India)
Imagery:
- Satellogic (Argentina), Chang Guang (China), etc.
- Government-owned systems (Sentinel (Europe), INSAT (India), IGS (Japan))
Weather:
- Government-owned systems (Sentinel (Europe), METEOSAT (Europe), METOP-C (Europe))
Radar:
- IcEye (Finland), Synspective (Japan), iQPS (Japan)
- Government-owned systems (RadarSat (Canada), IGS (Japan–Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center), SARAH (Germany-Bundeswehr))
Radio Frequency Monitoring (RFM):
- Unseenlabs (France), Kleos Space (maybe)(Luxembourg)
- Government-owned systems (DGA (France–CERES), CNES (France-N3SS))
Missile Warning:
- None(?)
It’s not a bad start, and there are more than what’s listed here for Ukraine to choose from. At least the nation has a few choices. It could use the products and services from all the choices. It’s also unclear if European military satellites' products and services would be accessible. I assume they would be because of Europe’s commitment to Ukraine. Similar questions surround the Japanese military satellites.
Only one category, missile warning, doesn’t have alternatives. The mission relies on military satellites like the U.S. Space Force’s Space Based InfraRed System (SBIRS). There don’t appear to be commercial equivalents (why would there be?).
OneWeb is likely a poor alternative to Starlink, considering its reliance on hubs required for terrestrial connections. But it’s better than nothing. The same is true for SES’s mPower satellites. If only Europe had rolled out IRIS2 earlier. Alas, it will take the eight companies involved at least six more years (probably longer) to do what SpaceX did in three.
Some of the alternatives from China are probably unrealistic. However, it depends on how weak China’s government would like Russia’s military to become. There’s little downside to having a hollow military force across the border for China. It also depends on whether China wants wider service adoption from its commercial companies. Even BeiDou might be on the table as the government tries to create a competitive alternative to GPS.
The other categories, Radar, Weather, Imagery, GNSS, and RFM, have alternatives that Ukraine might want to consider (it probably has). If the U.S. government decides to move back in time again and attempt isolationism again despite what was said during that Musk, Trump, and Zelensky phone call, then Ukraine’s government should not only consider these alternatives but also provide resources so that its troops can train with the alternative services.
As noted earlier–Ukraine might not have a choice. Considering the consequences to that nation if the U.S. pulled its space assets out, Zelensky couldn’t afford to trust their words. The fact that Russia is now using North Korean troops to do its fighting means that the war could go on longer without forcing Vladimir Putin to mobilize the Russian population. Ukraine needs its edge to make the war less palatable to Russia and North Korea. Maybe alternative space assets can help it.
If you liked this analysis (or any others from Ill-Defined Space), please share it. I also appreciate any donations (I like taking my family out every now and then). For the subscribers who have donated—THANK YOU from me and my family!!
Either or neither, please feel free to share this post!
If you liked this analysis (or any others from Ill-Defined Space), please share it. I also appreciate any donations (I like taking my family out every now and then). For the subscribers who have donated—THANK YOU from me and my family!!
Either or neither, please feel free to share this post!
Comments ()