Maginot Line in Space: U.S. Missile Defense
One of the latest of the many current administration antics is a focusing of the U.S. military on missile defense, called an “Iron”—then “Golden”--Dome (which is a softer metal–also, wouldn’t Orange be a more appropriate color?). How an administration that failed to build a border fence during its first four years will handle the infinitely more challenging problem of nationwide missile defense will be interesting to watch.
And that’s not including the challenges.
Nationwide Missile Defense
The United States Space Force (USSF) leadership has already pounced on the idea. It identified a “team of experts” who must determine how the USSF can use what it has to help with missile defense and what it still needs to develop. The USSF plans to use the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) satellite sensor and communications system.
At the same time, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) looks like it’s about to get a second financial wind. The MDA has been working hard on missile defense for a long time (decades—although U.S. missile defense efforts have gone on for much longer). It has still not overcome some of the challenges that would need to be overcome for a system like Orange Dome to work.
The PWSA was intended to be used for some missile defense tasks, anyway, so the USSF seeing potential increased appropriations opportunities and jumping in is no surprise. However, it may impact area coverage prioritization and tasking for the USSF (until a new administration comes along). It also keeps the USSF in a support role, a position it’s incredibly comfortable with. The appropriations would be for that support, not building the service’s lethality and flexibility.
The concept of missile defense has been around for a long time, but let’s assume that not only does the administration and Congress appropriate a lot more money for it, but that the system eventually works, and works well. Then what? Looking at history tells us that while some elaborate defense systems work, they work until someone chooses to avoid the system altogether. The German military did that during World War II, bypassing France’s Maginot Line.
Fortifying France
The Maginot Line was very good at what it did: buy time for the French military while not allowing Germany to march unopposed into France. The most famous part of the Line was a complex of nearly 6,000 concrete and steel fortifications strung along France’s border with Germany. It was state of the art (I saw some similarities with operational U.S. ICBM crew capsules). Not only was it a system, but it was also part of France’s overall defense strategy. It allowed the French military to, it believed, confront the Germans on its terms. In avoiding the fortifications, the Germans would face France’s best soldiers, who would stop Germany’s advance.
If the Maginot Line’s fortifications were attacked directly, the system’s design allowed tens of thousands of French troops to hold off hundreds of thousands of the opposing force’s troops. And the Line’s troops managed to do that during World War II when some German divisions frontally attacked it: the Alsace-Lorraine section, defended by about 20,000 French, held off over 250,000 German troops. The Maginot Line was never breached or conquered during WWII, but its troops surrendered, responding to orders from the French High Command.
Everything brought forward so far seems like a good argument for building a missile shield for the United States. However, at least one interesting parallel exists between the French and U.S. governments' reasons for investing in such elaborate defensive systems—human resources, for one.
A Quality of Its Own
A major reason for France’s investment in the Maginot Line was that its population was nearly half that of Germany’s. As noted earlier, the fortifications allowed a smaller force to keep a larger force at bay. It was also a cheaper option (important when recovering from World War I) than training the soldiers required to defend against Germany (by nearly half) were the Line not in place. And even if those French troops were trained, they’d still face a superior number of Germans. So the forts made sense.
This is a similar reason for the U.S. military’s general use of space–it allows the Department of Defense to maintain less of a standing force while projecting power. Remember that a more significant standing force requires the basics to keep them alive and the hardware to let them win wars. It would get costly really quickly. However, space helps keep costs and workforce low while allowing the DoD to fulfill its mission. Despite being a smaller force, the U.S. military remains the most lethal military in the world.
A missile shield may allow the U.S. military to remain small, allowing recruiters to hit their modest recruiting targets.
The Perfect Answer to the Last Conflict
France has a history of wars with Germany, with World War I as another incentive to build the Maginot Line. French forts played a significant role in WWI, but not in the way one might think. In 1916, the German military captured Fort Douaumont with little effort. This is because the French High Command had observed the Germans sweeping away Belgian fortifications. Due to Germany's success, France’s generals decided its fortifications were useless, removing most of Douaumont’s (and other French forts) weapons.
The Germans used the captured fort effectively against the French (it was constructed to withstand a heavier pounding than its Belgian counterparts). Nine months after the Germans occupied it, the French recaptured the fort, but at a cost of 100,000 troops. It was a lesson the French military took to heart when it came up with the Maginot Line. But, as with missile defense, the lesson was based on experiences and assumptions from the previous war.
The Maginot Line and assumptions for its existence may have also contributed to the French politicians and populace becoming complacent. It was the perfect defense, with no need for significant investments in other military projects. France’s politicians probably played into that sentiment (as U.S. politicians do today to U.S. citizens). The Germans would have to be crazy to attack the defense complex directly.
It was so good that the Germans avoided frontally attacking it when possible. Instead of throwing more people and ammunition at the Maginot Line, the Germans managed to get the French leadership to surrender and order the surrender of the troops in the Maginot Line.
This is not to say that U.S. adversaries will do the same thing. Chances are they can’t or won’t. However, U.S. adversaries will do something different. Smart ones, anyway. And since there are a lot of people in and outside the U.S. working against its interests, it would be good to assume there are quite a few smart ones involved.
A thought for further pondering: The missile defense concept and attempts to build it up have existed since at least the 1980s. That is worse than building a system based on lessons from the last conflict–it’s building on lessons from conflicts decades before now. Given a few more decades, the new missile system might eventually work. However, as we’ve seen with the Maginot Line, the opponent’s technology and tactics may have moved beyond the need for engaging with a missile defense shield.
Somehow, this missile shield will keep Americans safe despite the existence of stealth drones and cruise missiles that are probably not trackable, especially within the U.S. And those are just the tip of a vast array of weapons choices. Militaries willing to attack the U.S. will use unexpected tactics and technologies that will make the missile shield’s existence useless, even if it works perfectly. It would be dumb for them to attack a nation’s strongest defense.
It’s unclear if the missile shield will be effective against a mass attack against the U.S. No missile attacks have occurred yet against the U.S., which may mean we’re lucky or our adversaries are unwilling to attack the U.S. when it has so many destructive retaliatory options available. If the missile shield becomes successfully operational, however, U.S. citizens and politicians should understand that it would be one of many military options and that there will always be ways to get around it.
Just ask the French.
Space and missile defense have always been intertwined. However, non-space history can still provide some lessons. If you’re interested in a consultation, please contact me through LinkedIn.
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